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PUBLIC REGULATION OF QUASI -PUBLIC
CORPORATIONS.
It was that ancient master of the common law, Sir Edward
Coke, who, protesting that reason was the very life of the law,
gravely observed that a corporation could not be excommuni-
cated because it had no soul. So, likewise, Sir William Black-
stone, in his famous commentaries, recorded for the instruction
of succeeding generations that a corporation could not commit
.treason or felony because it was incapable of suffering a traitor's
or felon's punishment. These two learned opinions were
epitomized for popular use in the sententious saying of Selden
that "A corporation has no neck to be hanged by, nor soul to
be damned by." Somewhat akin to these views is that of Chief
Justice Marshall that "A corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law," for which the great chief justice has been derided by
modern critics and professors of the law as a veritable old
fogy, unskilled in the magic mysteries of corporation law.
And yet popular judgment still holds him and these three
ancient worthies in high esteem; and from what can be seen of
the operations of "Standard Oil," "Consolidated Copper" and
"United States Steel," the public fully concurs in their opinions,
and seems inclined occasionally to exercise its powers to regulate
these artificial beings for the promotion of the public welfare.
There lived, also, in England, in olden times, another judge,
"whose words were regarded with as much care as if they had
been found in Magna Charta," who made bold to declare that
"Whenever conveniences are affected with a public interest
they cease to bejuris privat" only." These words of Lord Hale,
found in his treatise De Poribus Maris, as expressive of existing
law in the seventeenth century, were invoked in England in the
eighteenth century as the basis 'of the acts regulating common
carriers and inn-keepers, and (by Lords Kenyon and Ellen-
borough) for the regulation of warehouses.
The suggestions in Commissioner Garfield's report of last
December that the doctrine of public regulation be now further
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applied by the federal government to American railroads,
and that the measure will receive the support of the
administration and the antagonism of the great railway
corporations, presages an approaching conflict which gives
special interest to the law relating to the regulation of quasi-
public corporations.
Prior to 1876, this doctrine of public regulation of private
corporations seems not to have commanded general attention in
the United States. The Dartmouth College Case, decided in i819,
had conclusively settled the law to be that the charter of a
private corporation was a contract between the state and the
corporation which could not be impaired by state law. For a
half century the general idea, commonly accepted throughout
the country, seems to have been that this decision afforded com-
plete protection to all railway corporations, and effectually
prevented any interference by legislation. Or better stated,
perhaps, the public sentiment in favor of internal improve-
ments was so stong that no challenge was made by the public
which would seem to interfere with the rights of self regula-
tion by all the transporting corporations.
Tn 1871 and 1872, under the impulse of the Granger move-
ment. which was the organization of farmers, planters and
graziers for their own protection and advantage, the great
northwestern states had enacted statutes regulatihg tolls and
tariffs of railways and public warehouses; and in x875, these
statutes having been challenged for unconstitutionality in the
state courts, three cases were brought before the Supreme Court
of the United States for argument, involving the statutes of
Illinois, Iowa and Wisconsin. They were commonly known as
"The Granger Cases," and were argued in January, 1876, as
the Chief Justice declared, "by the most eminent counsel in a
manner worthy of their well-earned reputation," before a court
composed of Waite, Chief Justice, and Associate Justices
Clifford, Swayne, Miller, Davis, Field, Strong, Bradley and
Hunt. Concluding his opinion, the Chief Justice said: "We
have kept the cases long under advisement in order that the
decision might be the result of our mature deliberation." The
opinions were delivered March ist, 1877, in all three cases by the
Chief Justice-Justices Field and Strong dissenting. The
Illinois statute required a license for public warehousing df
grain in cities of over ioo,ooo population, and fixed a maximum
price for storage. The Wisconsin and Iowa statutes established
maximum rates of fare and freight for railroads operating in
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those states respectively. The validity of all these acts was
sustained by the courts, and the cases are reported in 94 U. S.,
pages 1x3 and 178, inclusive. The keynote of these decisions
is found in the following sentence from the opinion in the case
of Munn V. Illinois:
"When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in
which the public has an interest, he in effect grants to the pub-
lic an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by
the public for the common good to the extent of the interest he
has thus created."
This was a criminal prosecution against individuals for
warehousing without license. The other two cases, styled
respectively C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, and Peik v. C. & N.
W. Ry. Co., were bills filed against state officers to restrain
them from enforcing the rate statutes of the several states
against the railroad companies; and the doctrine above stated
was applied alike to warehousemen and railway companies.
The effect of the decisions of these "Granger cases" was
firmly to settle, as tersely stated in the Munn case, that
"When private property is devoted to a public use it is subject
to public regulation." No discrimination whatever was made
against corporations. Natural and artificial beings were by
these decisions placed upon the same footing and subjected to
the same rules, and the private warehousemen and the incor-
porated railroad companies were all treated alike; all were held
equally subject to the legislative power of the state, because
their property was devoted to a public use. So much for the
Granger cases and the law firmly established by them.
Corporations which are thus subject to public regulation
have by common usage come to be called quasi-public-almost
public. They cannot be properly called public corporations for
their object is profit-making. They are stock corporations
voluntarily organized by corporators, and managed by a board
of directors chosen by the stockholders. They have all the
powers, attributes, and incidents pertaining to private corpora.
tiong, and would be called such but for their public uses, func-
tions or relations. Whether a private corporation is quasi-
public is to be determined by the answer given to the following
questions: i. Is its property devoted to a public use? 2. Are
its franchises of a public nature? 3. Must it deal with all
persons without arbitrary discrimination? 4. Has it the power
of eminent domain? If the answer to any or all of these ques.
tions is affirmative then the corporation is quasi-public.
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No difficulty is experienced in answering these questions
with regard to a railway company. It possesses all those
faculties, and is of course subject to public regulation. Its
property is devoted to public use; its franchises are of a public
nature; it is a common carrier and must necessarily have the
power of eminent domain. Those, therefore, who have denied
the public power of regulating railroads have made themselves
fair subjects for the shafts of ridicule by antagonizing all the
rules of law upon this subject.
Prior to the year 1887, the regulation of railways had been
left entirely to the several states; but in that year Congress saw
fit to assume the power granted it by the Federal Constitution
"to regulate commerce among the several states" upon the
basis declared in the Granger cases, and accordingly passed the
Interstate Commerce Act. Among its requirements are
reasonable and equal charges without discrimination or rebate;
publication of rates; official disclosure on inquest of any viola-
tion of these regulations, and statutory pardon to those making
it; forbidding pooling or unnotified change of rates; establish-
ing the rule of long and short haul for freight and persons;
permitting lower charges for train loads than for car loads, and
for car loads than small consignments. This act, challenged
before the courts as unconstitutional, has been uniformly sus-
tained as valid legislation. Its enforcement is committed to a
body of commissioners called the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. It cannot be said that this commission has thoroughly
abolished rebates and discriminations and brought about that
ideal kind of railway transportation which the framers of the
act had in mind; but it must be conceded that the commission
has done much by the enforcement of this act to eradicate the
evils theretofore existing, and to insure reasonable and impar-
tial transportation. The commission has been somewhat ham-
pered by the narrowness of its scope of power and the unfav-
orable decisions of partial judges. Congress is expected soon
to relieve the commission of its impotency by conferring addi-
tional power upon it to the end that it may, if possible, eradi-
cate the unendurable evils and wrongs of a corrupt and cor-
rupting system of transportation.
In 189o Congress still further exercised its constitutional
power in the passage of the Sherman Act. This act declared
every contract or combination in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states to be illegal, and fixed penalty there-
for. It forbade monopoly and conspiracy to monopolize inter-
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state commerce, and assessed punishment therefor. The con-
stitutionality of this act was sharply challenged in the celebrated
case of Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197.
But after elaborate argument and careful consideration by the
full court, it was declared valid by the casting vote of Mr.
Justice Brewer, upon the ground that the Northern Securities
Company was "an unreasonable combination in restraint of
interstate commerce," and must therefore be dissolved. Id. p.
363. Most of the states have. similar statutes forbidding unlaw-
ful restraints and monopolies by railway companies, and they,
too, have been generally sustained by the courts.
In many states, also, acts have been passed regulating the
railway fare and freight charges, or authorizing commissions so
to do, as is done in the Interstate Commerce Act. These acts
have been the subject of frequent and strenuous contention in
the state and federal courts, resulting in a variety of decisions
which are not entirely harmonious. The Granger cases above
referred to seem to concede to the legislature absolute power
of regulation. At least there was no limitation placed upon the
legislative power to regulate rates in those decisions. Later
cases, however, decided by the same court, have declared those
statutes void which fix rates, or allow them to be fixed, so low
as to deprive the railway companies of profit in their business,
upon the ground that they work unlawful confiscation of private
property. In the Railway Commission Cases, ii6 V. S. 331,
Chief Justice Waite declared the opinion of the court that
"inder pretense of regulating fares and freights the state
cannot require a railroad corporation to carry persons or
property without reward. Neither can it do that which in law
amounts to a taking of private property for public use without
just compensation or due process of law." The same doctrine
was repeated in Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128
U. S. 174; and in Chicago, -4f. & St. P. R. R. Co. v. Minnesota,
134 U. S. 418, it was held that a state law prescribing rates of
charges and forbidding judicial inquiry as to the reasonable-
ness of such rates was unconstitutional, as denying to the rail-
way company the benefit of due process of law. The whole
subject was thoroughly reviewed by Mr. Justice Harlan in an
exhaustive opinion delivered in Smyth v. Ames, x69 U. S. 466,
resulting in the declaration that a state law which would not
permit the carrier to earn just compensation would be invalid
as depriving it of its property without due process of law, and
that while the rates were primarily proper matter for legislao
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tive determination, the question whether they amounted to
practical confiscation could not be so conclusively determined
by the legislature as to prevent it from becoming the subject of
judicial inquiry.
Under this modified doctrine the courts necessarily assume
the power and duty of testing whether a legislative act is a
reasonable regulation of rates. This must depend of course
upon the special facts operating in each case. Presumably the
legislative decision is just; but if the enforcement of the law
will deprive the company of just compensation, the courts will
prevent its enforcement.
These decisions result in bringing state statutes to the same
test of reasonableness which has long been applied to municipal
ordinances regulating rates for public utilities. It may seem
strange that the courts shall have the power to nullify a legis-
lative act because it is unreasonable; and yet, there is no other
standard of constitutional judgment. The legislature may
regulate rates in the public interest, but may not confiscate
private property. If the act simply regulates, it is reasonable
and constitutional; if it operates as a confiscation, it is unreas-
onable and unconstitutional.
Speaking of these decisions of the Supreme Court, Mr.
Justice Brewer, in Cot.ng v. Stock-Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79,
tersely sums up: "It is declared that the present nature of the
property is the basis by which the test of reasonableness is to
be determined." And Mr. Justice Holmes, in San Diego Land
& Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 442, declared: "What the
company is entitled to demand in order that it may have just
compensation is a fair return upon the reasonable value of the
property at the time it is being used for the public."
The courts must, of course, decide what is reasonable value
upon due consideration of the various elements entering into a
just valuation. This subject has given the courts no little
trouble; nor is this strange, for the same problem generally
arises in ascertaining all values. It has been suggested that the
courts should consider the cost of the plant, original and added;
operating expenses; revenue under the proposed rates; present
cost of construction, and the amount of stocks and bonds of the
company. The Supreme Court of California, in San Diego
Water Co. v. San Diego, zi8 Cal. 556, said: "In determining
such values, three, and we believe only three, methods are pos-
sible: (i) either by ascertaining what the property could be sold
for (its market value); (2) by ascertaining what it would cost to
QUASI-PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
replace it; or (3) by ascertaining the revenue it is capable of
producing." The first of these woula require actual sale; the
second would depend solely upon expert opinion. The revenue
basis seems the fair and feasible one. The courts, however,
have declined to be governed exclusively by any particular
method, treating the question as a practical one to be tested in
each case by its own peculiar circumstances. The question was
considered in Smyth v. Ames, supra; San Diego Land & Town Co.
v. National City, 174 U. S. 739; Same v. jaspier, 189 U. S. 439;
and Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin & K. R. C. I. Co., 192 U.
S. 201, with the general result that no one method of estimating
values is to control; but that cost of plant and operation, and
depreciation and fair profit were all elements which "ought to
be taken into consideration, and such weight be given them
when rates are being fixed, as under all the circumstances
would be just to the company and to the public."
The object of public regulation of railroads is to protect the
public against (a) physical dangers incident to the operation of
the railroad; (b) discomfort and inconvenience to the traveling
public and shippers; (c) the oppressions and exactions suffered
from the abuse of the tremendous powers conferred upon them
by law.
If it be said that our consideration of this power of public
regulation has been confined solely to the matter of rates, it is
fair to answer that to a profit-making corporation this is the
most important of all forms of regulation; and if it can or must
submit to regulation of this sort it will scarcely be heard to
complain of any other. So, too, if the public may regulate
railway corporations, it goes without saying that it may con-
trol all lesser ones, including canals, turnpikes, street railways,
bridges, ferries, water companies, gas companies, electrib light
and power companies, telegraphs, telephones, irrigation com-
panies, storage companies, levee companies, and the like.
They are created by the state and endowed with franchises
and powers which are alike, in a greater or less measure, of
public use. They have devoted their property in some degree
to public service, for which they demand compensation. Some
of them, if not all, may exercise the sovereign power of emi-
nent domain, solely because the property taken by them is for
public use. Power and duty are correlative. Public service
must follow public franchises and powers, and the public has
the right to demand that the service shall be good and the
charges reasonable. This can be effected only through the
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medium of the legislature and the courts, and through these
the public has the right to require that justice shall be
done to all.
The substance of our brief paper on this interesting subject
may be thus summarized: (x) the objects of the regulation of
quasi-public corporations are the protection of public safety in
life and property, and the prevention of public imposition
and extortion; (2) all federal and state statutes.and municipal
ordinances, reasonable in terms and operation, and obviously
tending to promote these objects and effect these results,
are valid; (3) all those in which public regulation is a mani-
fest pretext for inter-meddling with corporate affairs, or which
result in the confiscation of corporate property are null and void.
Henry H. Ingersoll.
